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Abstract
Opioid overdose is the leading cause of unintentional death in the U.S. Narcan TM (Naloxone)
is a prescription medicine that can reverse overdose effects. This research investigates the effect
of Naloxone access laws on overdose death rates using state and temporal variation in the
enactment of these laws. We also explore possible spillover effects between Naloxone access
laws and overdose death rates across states. Our analyses reveal that when broken down by
access law provisions, there exists a mixture of positive and negative effects on overdose death
rates depending upon the provision. The results indicate that Naloxone access provisions have
regional impacts by influencing overdose death rates within the state enacted and have a spillover
effect in neighboring states. The magnitude of spillover effects is larger than direct effects in
the states. Looking across multiple provisions, our findings provide no statistical evidence that
these laws reduce opioid death rates.
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1 Introduction
Opioid overdose is the leading cause of unintentional death in the U.S. (Visconti et al. (2015)). From
2000 to 2014, half a million people in the U.S. died from opioid overdoses, with over 28,000 dying
in 2014 alone.1 Overdose deaths have become such a problem in the U.S. that life expectancy has
dropped two years in a row (Stobbe, 2017. State response to the opioid crisis can be categorized by
attempts to limit the supply of opioids through prescription drug monitoring programs and attempts
to reduce the number of overdoses by authorizing the provision of drugs such as Naloxone (Davis
and Chang (2013); Davis et al. (2013); Davis et al. (2014)). Naloxone is a prescription drug that
counteracts the effects of an overdose, making it an extremely powerful, though complicated, drug
in that its provision may create a false sense of security among addicts.
In this research, we estimate the effect of state level Naloxone access laws on overdose deaths
using a spatial difference-in-differences framework. This analysis provides us with estimates of both
within state and the spillover effects among contiguous states from enacting a Naloxone access
law. The spillover analysis allows us to document biases of the standard model. We find that
when Naloxone access laws are broken down by their provisions, a mixture of positive and negative
impacts on opioid overdose death rates occurs, particularly within neighboring states. These results
mean that state level adaptation of a Naloxone access law is associated primarily with either higher
or lower opioid overdose deaths in neighboring states, and within the state itself. Thus, important
spillover effects exist from the various provisions of Naloxone access laws on opioid overdose death
rates.
Our main contribution to the literature is developing a SDID (Spatial Difference in Difference)
framework to investigate the spillover effects of state level Naloxone access laws on overdose death
rates in surrounding states. In addition, we examine the different impacts of version provisions of
access law as explained in section 2. Enactment of Naloxone access laws demonstrates suggestive
evidence of spatial dependence in that neighboring states begin to adopt these laws, especially after
20132. To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has controlled for the spatial interaction
between Naloxone access laws and opioid overdose death rates so that the regional aspects of these
laws has not been investigated.
The rest of the manuscript proceeds as follows. Section two provides background information
on trends in opioid overdose and Naloxone access laws. Section three provides an empirical model
and section four describes the data. In section five, we explain the method and spatial econometric
framework. Section six reports the results and robustness checks. We conclude in section seven
with a discussion and policy implications.
2 Background
2.1 Opioid Trends
Mortality from opioid overdose has more than quadrupled since 19993. Figure 1 compares opioid
overdose death rates among states in 1999 and 2014. Opioid overdose death rate increased during
this time period in every state. In 2014, West Virginia had the highest rate of overdose death,
while North Dakota had the lowest rate of overdose deaths. Between 1999 and 2014, increases in
opioid overdose death rates ranged from 3.25 per 100,000 in California to 28.30 per 100,000 in West
Virginia.
1For more information please refer to Rudd et al. (2016)
2Available at: http://lawatlas.org/
3Available at: https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html
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Figure 1: Opioid overdose death per 100,000, 1999 and 2014
Overdoses occur when a person takes a lethal or toxic amount of opiates  such as an illicit
drug (e.g. heroin) or prescription medications (e.g. oxycodone).4. Opiate overdoses can lead to
depressed or slowed breathing, confusion, lack of oxygen to the brain, and possibly even death.
Opioids have the potential for misuse even when prescribed for a legitimate reasons, such as a
work-related injury.5
In 2015, 2.8 million private industry workers and 752,000 public sector workers suffered from
nonfatal workplace injuries, many of which led to opioid receipt and potentially addiction and/or
overdose (Salsberg, 2015).6 Former Food and Drug Administration head David Kessler called the
opioid epidemic one of the great mistakes of modern medicine7), workplace injuries were a driver
for prescribing opioids that have the potential to transform into addiction and ultimately overdose
and death.
Reducing opioid abuse and controlling overdose deaths is an important policy goal for both
state and federal governments. For many years, opioid overdose prevention programs have provided
protection services. Since 1996, an increasing number of community based programs have provided
Naloxone (a non-controlled substance opioid8) to laypersons to reverse the effects of opioid overdose.
Narcan TM (Naloxone) is a prescription medicine that can block the effects of opioids with no life
threatening effects on the opiate users.9 Naloxone acts on a person's brain by attaching to the same
part of the brain that receive the opioid (Naloxoneinfo, 2017). Once administered, Naloxone takes
two to three minutes for its effect to occur. If an overdose victim does not wake up, a second dose
should be delivered.
Examples of Naloxone saving lives abound. For instance, Chad Ward, an Emergency Medical
Services Supervisor in Huntington, WV noted that in 2015, there was 944 drug overdoses in Cabell
County, which is 300% more than overdoses in 2014. By having access to Naloxone, Chad is able to
save many patients.10. In another more famous example, the musician Prince suffered an oxycodone
4Importantly, many legally prescribed opioids are taken illegally by individuals who were not the original patient.
5Available at: http://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-treatment/treatment/opioid-overdose
6Available at: https://apnews.com/ccea326c84b747cdb1d7bff83efdb303/workers-comp-programs-fight-addiction-
among-injured-workers
7Available at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/former-fda-head-doctor-david-kessler-opioid-epidemic-one-of-
great-mistakes-of-modern-medicine/
8A controlled substance is generally an opioid or chemical whose manufacture, possession, or use is regulated by
a government, such as illicitly used opioids or prescription medications.
9Available at: http://stopoverdoseil.org/narcan.html
10Available at: http://www.wsaz.com/content/news/WSAZ-Investigates-A-Dose-of-Reality-368538771.html
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overdose on April 15, 2016. After giving two doses of Narcan he recovered. However, six days later,
he overdosed for the last time on Fentanyl a synthetic opioid 50 times more powerful than heroin
.11
The examples above demonstrate the conflicting viewpoints of Naloxone. Whether Naloxone
saves lives or simply delays overdose death is the paradox at the center of whether it is a solution to
the overdose epidemic.12 ,13 ,14 ,15 That it may give a false sense of security to users makes Naloxone
a prime example of a moral hazard issue in health economics.16 Maine Governor, Paul LePage is
among the most outspoken of Naloxone access opponents who believes by providing Naloxone to
opioid users, they may be saved once, but they are just going to die later .17
With the growth in overdose deaths, interest in assessing the effects of Naloxone access laws and
overdose prevention programs on overdose deaths has increased (e.g. Walley et al. (2013); Visconti
et al. (2015). Adaption of the Naloxone access laws is associated with a 9 to 11 percent reduction in
opioid- related deaths (Rees et al. (2017)). In another study, Siegler (2015) found a 16% decrease,
but his results were not statistically significant for heroin-related overdose mortality in New York
City after the implementation of overdose prevention program. Similarly, Rees et al. (2017) find
statistically insignificant effects of the Naloxone access law on heroin-related deaths in the U.S.
No previous research has accounted for the spatial spillovers of access laws between states.
Without accounting for spatial spillovers, the results may be biased due to model misspecification.
In other words, by ignoring spatial aspects, only within state effects of the law are examined with
the assumptions that an access law and overdose death rate in one state are totally independent of
access laws and death rates in neighboring states. These assumptions ignore the effects of access
laws on adjacent states which could be in a same direction or opposite.
2.2 Naloxone Access Laws
Naloxone has been available by prescription since 1996 although the legal environments for prescrib-
ing and dispensing Naloxone varies by state. State legislations have enacted a variety of provisions
to expand and ease prescribing and distributing Naloxone to prevent overdoses. For example, a
number of states have passed laws that involve less civil and criminal liability, whether for pre-
scribers, dispensers or users (Lim et al. (2016)). The reasoning behind implementing these laws was
to remove the barriers to Naloxone distribution and use. In some states, prescriptions of Nalox-
one can be authorized to third parties, while in other states, laypersons are immune from criminal
and/or civil liability when administering Naloxone. Additional versions of the law remove criminal
liability for possession of Naloxone. In some states prescribing by a standing order 18 is authorized
while in other states it is not.
The list below provides our breakdown of Naloxone access law provisions into eleven types of
provisions.
11Available at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/official-pills-found-at-princes-estate-contained-fentanyl/
12Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/us/opioids-narcan-drug-overdose-heroin-
fentanyl.html?emc=eta1
13Available at: http://www.wsaz.com/content/news/WSAZ-Investigates-A-Dose-of-Reality-368538771.html
14Available at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/official-pills-found-at-princes-estate-contained-fentanyl/
15Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4675355/pdf/nihms742274.pdf
16Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/us/naloxone-eases-pain-of-heroin-epidemic-but-not-
without-consequences.html?emc=eta1
17Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/maine-governor-paul-lepage-heroin-
addicts_us_5717ef01e4b0479c59d6e865
18A standing order is a physician's order that can be carried out by other health care workers when predetermined
conditions have been met. Available at: http://naloxoneinfo.org/case-studies/standing-orders
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NAL 1. Having a Naloxone access law
NAL 2. Having immunity from criminal prosecution for prescribing, dispensing or distributing
Naloxone to a layperson for prescribers
NAL 3. Having immunity from civil liability for prescribing, dispensing or distributing Naloxone to
a layperson for prescribers
NAL 4. Having immunity from professional sanctions for prescribing, dispensing or distributing
Naloxone to a layperson for prescribers
NAL 5. Having immunity from criminal prosecution for prescribing, dispensing or distributing
Naloxone to a layperson for dispensers
NAL 6. Having immunity from civil liability for prescribing, dispensing or distributing Naloxone to
a layperson for dispensers
NAL 7. Having immunity from professional sanctions for prescribing, dispensing or distributing
Naloxone to a layperson for dispensers
NAL 8. Third parties' authorization to prescribe Naloxone
NAL 9. Pharmacists are allowed to dispense or distribute naloxone without a patient- specific pre-
scription from another medical professional.
NAL 10. Immunity from criminal liability when administering Naloxone for a layperson
NAL 11. Immunity from civil liability when administering Naloxone for a layperson
NAL 12. Removing criminal liability for possession of Naloxone
New Mexico was the first state to amend its laws (in 2001) to make it easier for medical profes-
sionals to prescribe Naloxone and for lay administrators to use it without fear of legal repercussions.
Table 1 shows the effective date of the Naloxone law passed starting from 2001. A total of 27 states
and the District of Columbia adopted a Naloxone access law prior to 2015 with an additional 18
states adopting laws since 2015. Twenty-three of these states allowed standing orders (also called
non-patient-specific prescriptions) (Rees et al., 2017). Figure 2 shows the distribution of Naloxone
access law at two points of time: 2001 and 2014. As shown in this figure, states with access laws
by 2014 are concentrated on the east and west coasts. Table 2 demonstrates the effective years for
different provisions of Naloxone access laws. For instance, while New Mexico was the first state to
enact Naloxone access laws, they did not enact provisions authorizing standing order prescription
or removing criminal liability for possession.
Numerous studies have analyzed the relationships between Naloxone access laws and overdose
deaths (Coffin et al. (2003); Seal et al. (2005); Walley et al. (2013); Davis (2015); Davis and
Carr (2015); Rowe et al. (2016); Coffin and Sullivan (2013); Enteen et al. (2010); Green et al.
(2008); Green et al. (2015) Inocencio et al. (2013); Lim et al. (2016); Wheeler et al. (2012)). These
studies generally investigate the effectiveness of Naloxone access on overdose deaths in observational
settings. For instance, according to Wheeler et al. (2012) between 1996 and 2014, community
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organizations provided Naloxone rescue kits to 152,283 laypersons and received reports of 26,463
overdose reversals. Evidence of Naloxone access laws as an overdose prevention tool in a nationwide
and regional scale is still mixed. In this study, we employ state level analysis in the dates of
enacting Naloxone access law to investigate the spillover effects of law enactment at the national
level to investigate if there is any regional spillover effects in opioid overdose and the Naloxone
access law enactment.
Table 1: Effective dates of Naloxone Access Laws, 1999-2014
State Naloxone Access Law effective date
California January 1, 2008
Colorado May 10, 2013
Connecticut October 1, 2003
Washington, D.C. March 19, 2013
Delaware August 4, 2014
Georgia April 24, 2014
Illinois January 1, 2010
Kentucky June 25, 2013
Maine April 29, 2014
Maryland October 1, 2013
Massachusetts August 2, 2012
Michigan October 14, 2014
Minnesota May 10, 2014
New Jersey July 1, 2013
New Mexico April 3, 2001
New York April 1, 2006
North Carolina April 9, 2013
Ohio March 11, 2014
Oklahoma November 1, 2013
Oregon June 6, 2013
Pennsylvania November 29, 2014
Rhode Island June 18, 2012
Tennessee July 1, 2014
Utah May 13, 2014
Vermont July 1, 2013
Virginia July 1, 2013
Washington June 10, 2010
Wisconsin April 9, 2014
Note: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Nevada, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
and West Virginia have adopted Naloxone access laws since 2014.
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Figure 2: Naloxone Access Law in 2001 and 2014
Table 2: Effective dates of Naloxone Access Law Provisions, 1999-2014
Year NL2 NL3 NL4 NL5 NL6 NL7 NL8 NL9 NL10 NL11 NL12
2001 NM NM NM NM NM NM NM
2002
2003 CT CT CT CT
2004
2005
2006
2007 NY
2008 CA CA CA CA
2009
2010 IL IL IL IL IL
WA WA WA WA
2011 CA
2012 MA MA RI RI MA
KY CO
MD CO DC
CO CO CO CO NJ KY DC KY
2013 NJ NJ KY CO CO KY NC NJ KY NJ DC
NC NC MD NJ NJ MD OK NC NJ NC VT
VT VT NJ VT VT NJ OR OR NC OR
VT VT VT VT
VA VA
CA
CA DE
DE CA DE CA GA GA CT CT
DE GA DE GA DE ME MA GA GA
GA MI GA DE MI GA MI MN MA MI
2014 MN MN OH GA MN PA OH NM MI MN
OH OH PA PA PA RI PA NY MN NY
PA PA RI UT TN TN RI OK NY PA
UT TN TN WI UT UT TN PA OH TN
WI UT UT WI WI UT RI PA UT
WI WI WI TN WI WI
WI
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3 Empirical Models
Empirical studies have shown that a number of factors influence opioid overdose deaths in the
U.S. Despite The opioid epidemic literature is lacking investigations that include the effects of
high-risk injury occupations such as mining, manufacturing and constructions, availability of drug
prescriptions and heroin related crime (as an indicator for availability of heroin) on opioid overdose
deaths. Table 3 shows the important variables, study region, their impact on overdose deaths and
the reference.
Table 3: Effective dates of Naloxone Access Law Provisions, 1999-2014
Variable Study Region Coefficient Sign Reference
Poverty New York City + Marzuk et al., 1997
districts
Income distribution New York City - Galea et al., 2003
neighborhoods Nandi et al., 2006
External characteristics of neighborhood New York City - Hembree et al., 2005
neighborhoods
Internal characteristics of neighborhood New York City - Hembree et al., 2005
neighborhoods
New York City
Police activity neighborhoods + Nandi et al., 2006
New York City Bohnert et al., 2011
police precinct
Unemployment Italy provinces - Gatti et al., 2007
Per capita GDP Italy provinces + Gatti et al., 2007
Urbanization Italy provinces + Gatti et al., 2007
Couples' separation Italy provinces + Gatti et al., 2007
Demographic factors (African-American men) Chicago + Scott et al., 2007
neighborhoods
Location relative to the U.S.-Mexico border New Mexico - Shah et al., 2012
counties
Heroin source/type, price and purity 27 U.S. MSAs +/- Unick et al., 2014
Educational attainment U.S states - Richardson et al., 2015
State medical cannabis laws U.S states - Bachhuber et al., 2014
Uninsured adults and health care cost New Mexico - Shah et al., 2012
counties
Substance Abuse Insurance Mandates U.S states - Selby, 2017
The difference-in-difference (DID) technique is an econometric tool first applied in the 19th
century to control for before-and-after implementation of a treatment or policy 19 (National Research
Council and others, 2004; Branas et al., 2011; Morris et al., 2014; Dimick and Ryan, 2014 are
examples of health-related research that have applied a DID analysis). A standard DID model
to evaluate the effects of a Naloxone access law by differentiating between treatment and control
(untreated) states is represented by:
19More information is available at: https://www.mailman.columbia.edu/research/population-health-
methods/difference-difference-estimation
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TODDrateit = α0 + α1Xit + α2NALitTit + νi + ωt + it (1)
where ODDrateit is the opioid overdose death rate in state i in year t. Xit is a vector of time- varying
covariates that control for factors such as: presence of a medical marijuana law, quantities of drug
prescription, amount of heroin related crime, high-injury and risky occupations, population density,
income inequality, uninsured rate, college attainment rate, spending on education, unemployment
rate, and poverty rate. NALitTit is the DID variable which takes a value of 1 if the state had a
Naloxone access law in that particular year and zero otherwise. νi is an unobservable, time-invariant
state effect, which subsumes the main effect of the Naloxone law, while ωt is a vector of year fixed
effects which subsumes the main effect of the variable T (time). it is an error term.
The standard DID model presented in equation (1) raises a possible issue with endogeneity for
the NAL variable, i.e. does the level of a state's opioid overdose death rate influence enactment of
a Naloxone access law in that state? We tested for this by examining state overdose death rates in
the year prior to enactment of an access law compared to rates in states without an access law. To
account for different years of means, we subtracted the state means from the national mean in that
year (for non-access law states, 2014 overdose death rates are used). A t-test showed no statistical
difference between access law and no access law states (t = -0.611, p =0.544). Based upon this
evidence, endogeneity in equation (1) is not seen as an issue.
Under a non-spatial econometric estimation, observations do not depend on location (LeSage
and Pace (2009); Elhorst (2014)). They are independent points and therefore there is no correlation
between them and their neighbors. However, LeSage and Pace (2009) explain the case of spatial
dependency: In contrast to point observations, for a region we rely on the coordinates of an interior
point representing the center (the centroid). An important point is that in spatial regression models
each observation corresponds to a location or region. In non-spatial models, each observation has
a mean of xiβ and a random component i where the observation i represents a region or point in
space at one location and is considered to be independent of observations in other locations. In other
words, independent or statistically independent observations imply that E(ij) = E(i)E(j) = 0.
This assumption of independence greatly simplifies models.
In most cases, this assumption is not applicable and observations located at different points or
regions are dependent (LeSage and Pace (2009). Suppose we have two regions (neighbors) i and j.
If these two regions are spatially correlated and normality for error terms is assumed, then:
yi ←→ yj (2)
where the dependent variable y in region j influences the dependent variable in its neighbor region
i, and vice versa.
All spatial models have a weight matrix W, which quantifies the spillover between regions.
Elhorst (2014) expresses the weight matrix as a tool to describe the spatial arrangement of the
geographical units in the sample. There are variety of units of measurement for spatial dependency
such as neighbors, distance, and links (Getis (2007)). In this study, we conducted and applied
different weight matrices and chose the appropriate contiguity weight matrix based on the nature
of the research. As Debarsy et al. (2012) point out given the cross-border shopping a weight matrix
for neighbors with border touching seems intuitively appealing.
The use of spatial difference-in-difference (SDID) models has gained attraction in urban eco-
nomics in recent years (Dubé et al. (2014); Sunak and Madlener (2014); Hembree et al. (2005)).
However, to the best of our knowledge few studies perform SDID model in public health and public
policy research (Andrade (2016); Chagas et al. (2016)) are noted exceptions). We argue that opioid
overdose death rates and Naloxone access laws need to be assessed within a regional framework.
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For example, adaptation of a policy in one state could be followed by surrounding states as well.
Marijuana legalization status in U.S. states is a good example of mimicking law enactment in neigh-
boring states. In such cases, not only would the variable of interest be affected by its own control
variables, but it also may be affected by its neighbors' control variables.
The medication (in our case Naloxone) can be transferred across state borders. In this case,
even though in one state there is no Naloxone access law, users can buy Naloxone in a neighboring
state and use it in their home state. This transmission of Naloxone could affect the opioid overdose
death rates in neighboring states. The opioid epidemic in the U.S. is clustered in specific regions
such as Appalachia and the Southwest 20, 21 (see Rudd et al. (2016)). Therefore, analyzing the
effectiveness of the Naloxone access law on opioid overdose deaths needs to be investigated within
a regional framework rather than a standard state level analysis.
When a spatial component (whether it be the spatial component of dependent variable, control
variables or the error term) is statistically significant, the coefficients estimated by non-spatial
models (in our case a general DID) would be biased. Also variances may be non-efficient (Griffith
(2005); LeSage and Pace (2009)). Accordingly, statistical tests such as t- and F-tests may be
invalid, leading researchers to interpret their results improperly. We conduct the estimation process
by adding the spatial component to a non-spatial econometric analysis in a panel data framework.
The general SDID model developed for opioid overdose death rate can be written as
TODDrateit =α0 + α1NALitTit +
∑
αjXijt + ρWTODDratejt + ϑWNALjtTjt
+ θWXjt + νi + ωt + it
(3)
where TODDrate stands for the opioid overdose deaths per 100,000 population in state i and time t,
NAL represents a dummy variable whether the state has a Naloxone access law in a given year. X is
a vector of demographic variables described above, while νi and ωt are state and year fixed effects,
respectively. The terms WTODDrate, WNALT, WX, and W denote the spatial components of
opioid overdose death, Naloxone access law, other control variables, and the error term. ρ,ϑ,and θ
represent the spillover effects of the dependent variable, independent variables, and the error term.
They explain the effects of dependent variable, independent variables and error term of neighboring
states j on the dependent variable in specific state i.
We examine the impact of Naloxone access laws with three different approaches. First, following
Rees et al. (2017), we impose a dummy variable for passage of a Naloxone access law at the state
level. For the second approach, we assess the impact of access laws by the number of days after
effective date of the law. To allow for the effects of the law to change over time, a quadratic form
of the days after the law enactment was included in this approach. By imposing the quadratic form
of the days after law variable, we will be able to see whether or not the effect of the law is constant
or diminishing over time. Finally, the third approach provides for a breakdown of access laws by
their provisions. Since Naloxone access laws are not homogenous, to evaluate the effects of the law
on opioid overdose deaths one needs to differentiate between the provisions included in each law.
For the X vector of control variables, there is some evidence in the literature that poverty, unem-
ployment, uninsured rate, and income inequality are each positively correlated with opioid overdose
deaths (Galea et al. (2003); Nandi et al. (2006); Gatti et al. (2007); Shah et al. (2012)). Conversely,
income and education have negative relationships with opioid overdose deaths (Richardson et al.,
20For more details, please refer to: http://www.realclearhealth.com/articles/2017/06/14/analysis_peering_into_
the_nations_opioid_crisis_through_a_regional_lens_110633.html
21For more details, please refer to: http://www.acutisdiagnostics.com/sites/default/files/Peeling_Back_the
_Curtain_on_Regional_Variation_in_the_Opioid_Crisis_FINAL_June_2017%20%281%29.pdf
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2015). We expect to see positive and significant effects of availability of legal and illegal opioids on
opioid overdose death rates. Medical marijuana laws should have a negative effect on opioid over-
dose death rates because we expect opioids and marijuana to be substitutes. Laws allowing medical
marijuana will likely reduce the cost of receiving marijuana and therefore decrease the quantity
demanded of opioids.
4 Data
Data for constructing the model come from a number of different sources. We use data from CDC
Wonder for 1999-2014 22 which contain the universe of overdose deaths and overdose death rates by
state in the U.S. We focus on the 48 continuous states of the U.S. and Washington, D.C. over this
time period. These data were compiled using underlying cause of death compressed mortality files.
The number of opioid-overdose deaths by state were classified using the International Classification
of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10). We include deaths coded as unintentional (X4044), homicide
(X85), undetermined intent (Y10Y14), and suicide cases (X 6064).23 Among deaths with opioid
overdose as the underlying cause, the type of opioid involved is indicated by the following ICD-
10 multiple cause-of-death codes: opioids (T40.0, T40.1, T40.2, T40.3, T40.4, or T40.6); heroin
(T40.1); natural and semisynthetic opioids (T40.2); methadone (T40.3); and synthetic opioids,
other than methadone (T40.4).
For our variable of interest, we create measures of whether the state had a Naloxone law, the
various provisions of each law, and effective dates from the Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System
(PDAPS).24 For control variables in the X vector, Unick et al. (2014) recommend including illicit
drug price. Without having access to such data for our time frame, we instead control for drug
arrests and quantity of prescription drug sales. Sale and possession related arrests of opium or
cocaine and their derivatives (Morphine, Heroin, and Codeine) were provided by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation to control for illicit opioids supply. The availability of prescription opioids came
from controlled substances transactions of prescriptions available through Automated Reports and
Consolidated Ordering System (ARCOS).25
State level economic variables such as per pupil spending on education, poverty rate, unemploy-
ment rate as well as population density and uninsured rate were obtained from U.S. Census Bureau.
Income inequality, high school attainment, and the college attainment data were obtained from the
U.S. state-level income inequality data and annual state-level measures of human capital attainment
at Mark W. Frank home page.26 Per capita personal income was based on the information provided
by Federal Reserve Bank of ST. Louis (FRED).27 Employment in mining, construction, and manu-
facturing and labor force are collected from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).28 Medical marijuana
law was collected from the leading source for pros and cons of controversial issues.29 Finally, the
spatial weight matrix - the shape file of U.S. states consisting of the latitudinal and longitudinal
coordinates of all the 48 states and D.C. was adapted from the U.S. Census Bureau (Tiger) report.
To control for spillover effects of Naloxone access laws, the 48 continuous U.S. states plus Dis-
22National Vital Statistics System (NVSS)
23As a robustness check we test the total number of opioid overdose deaths as the dependent variable (not restricted
to ICD-10 codes).
24Available at: http://pdaps.org/
25Available at: https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/arcos/retail_opioid_summary/
26Available at: http://www.shsu.edu/eco_mwf/inequality.html
27Available at: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/release?rid=151
28Available at: https://www.bls.gov/sae/data.htm
29Available at: http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881
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trict of Colombia were included in our analysis. In spatial analysis, continuity and neighborhoods
play vital roles (Tobler (1970)). We focused on contiguous states based on the first law of geogra-
phy: everything is related to everything else, closer things even more (Tobler (1970)). Descriptive
statistics for each variable are reported in table 4 along with the expect signs of Naloxone access
law and control variables. Following previous studies (Rees et al. (2017)) which found the negative
effect of the Naloxone access law on opioid overdose deaths, we expect to have a negative effects of
the law on opioid overdose death rates.
5 Methods
5.1 Exploring spatial dependency in opioid overdose death rates across states
As we mentioned in previous section, the economic distance concept is a motivation for spatial
spillover effects. Before analyzing spatial dependency by corresponding econometrics models, an
intuitive way to identify clusters is by looking at the map of the overdose death rates. Figure 3
shows the map of opioid overdose death rates for 1999 and 2014.
Opioid overdose death rates have increased over time. In 1999, only two states had an overdose
death rate between 8-10 percent. By 2014, 33 states had an overdose death rate between 8-30
percent. Also, some spatial clusters are obvious especially in 2014. New Mexico had the highest
opioid overdose death rate in 1999. In 2014, its surrounding states also had high rates of overdose
deaths. Substantial clustering also exists on the east coast.
Given the fact that opioid overdose death rates show visual evidence of clustering among states,
the next step is to detect spatial autocorrelation. Spatial autocorrelation measures the interrela-
tionship of opioid overdose death rate across neighboring states. A common index to find out the
spatial autocorrelation is the Global Moran's I index.30 As pointed out by Chen and Haynes (2015),
Moran's I is a test on a yearly base. A significant and positive z-value for Moran's I index implies a
positive spatial autocorrelation. Table 4 shows the results for Moran's I index for two points of time
and its z-statistics and p-value. These tests reveal that there is a significant spatial autocorrelation
among state level opioid overdose death rate in the U.S. This means the U.S. opioid overdose death
rate tend to be clustered together.
Moran's I index assesses the overall presence of spatial autocorrelation. This index could offset
the effects of spatial autocorrelation if some observations have a positive spatial autocorrelation
while the others show a negative spatial autocorrelation. For further examination, we also report
the results of local Moran's I test (LISA). Scatter plots of LISA shows observations in four different
quadrants: High value observation surrounded by high value observations (i.e. QI: HH) and 3 other
clustering for LH (QII), HL (QIV), and LL (QIII) quadrants. Figure 4 provides Moran scatter plots
of the US opioid overdose death rates in 1999 and 2014. This figure illustrates that in both years,
most of the states with high overdose rate are surrounded by states with high overdose rates. This
also is true for the states with low overdose death rates. Thus, we apply a first-order contiguity
weight matrix.
The existence of statistically significant spatial autocorrelation among states implies that the
ordinary least square estimations (non-spatial models) may lead toward biased estimates of the
regression results. Therefore, it is appropriate to apply spatial models in the analysis of Naloxone
access laws and opioid overdose death rate. As Delgado and Florax (2015) point out, identification
of causal effects is no longer valid if the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA)31 is
30More information is available at: http://ceadserv1.nku.edu/longa//geomed/ppa/doc/globals/Globals.htm
31Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption: potential outcomes for person i are unrelated to the treatment status
of other individuals
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Min Max Expected
Deviation sign of
coefficient
Opioid overdose death rates (per 100K pop) 6.30 4.08 0.15 29.94
Total opioid overdose death rates ( per 100K pop) 6.62 4.30 0.15 32.12
NAL 1 0.090 0.274 0 1 -
NAL 2 0.051 0.213 0 1 -
NAL 3 0.052 0.213 0 1 -
NAL 4 0.024 0.142 0 1 -
NAL 5 0.047 0.206 0 1 -
NAL 6 0.048 0.208 0 1 -
NAL 7 0.023 0.139 0 1 -
NAL 8 0.061 0.229 0 1 -
NAL 9 0.022 0.133 0 1 -
NAL 10 0.051 0.209 0 1 -
NAL 11 0.040 0.183 0 1 -
NAL 12 0.008 0.086 0 1 -
Days after Naloxone access law (days/1000) 0.142 0.573 0 5.015 -
Square of the days after Naloxone access law (days/1000) 349 1,978 0 25,150 +
Presence of Medical marijuana law 0.21 0.41 0 1 -
Heroin arrest rate (arrests/100k pop) 139.57 105.82 0.61 761.43 +
Opioid prescription (kg/100k pop) 56.527 41.023 6.911 496.506 +
Employment ratio (%) 0.14 0.04 0.002 0.26 +
Population density (Pop./mi2) 338.50 1,221.79 5.028 9,655.19 -/+
Income inequality (Income share for the top %10) (%) 44.44 4.90 33.27 62.17
College attainment (the total number of college 0.19 0.04 0.10 0.45 -
graduates/ the total state population) (%)
Spending on education ($1000) 9.22 2.83 4.16 20.60 -
Poverty rate (%) 13.30 3.37 5.60 23.90 +
Unemployment rate (%) 5.82 2.06 2.30 13.70 +
Uninsured rate (%) 13.23 3.97 3.00 26.10 +
Median HH income (Thousand dollars) 47.15 8.36 29.29 76.16 -
Per capita income (Thousand dollars) 36.81 8.45 20.56 70.46 -
Number of observations 784
Table 5: Moran's I index for U.S. opioid overdose death rate
1999 2014
Moran's I 0.407 0.329
z-statistics 5.413 3.842
p-value 0.01 0.01
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Figure 3: Opioid overdose death rates in the U.S. 1999 and 2014
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Figure 4: Moran's i scatter plot of U.S. state's opioid overdose death rates (1999 and 2014)
violated. A SUTVA violation means that in determining the treatment effect, considering one's own
treatment status is not sufficient. Treatment status of neighboring regions (in our case states) has
to be taken into account as well (Delgado and Florax (2015)).
5.2 Spatial econometric analysis
There are five different spatial models. The first of which is the spatial autoregressive lag model
(SAR) as shown in equation (3). Second, a Spatial Error Model (SEM) assumes dependency in
error term. SLX model or spatial lag of control variable assumes the control variables could play a
direct role in determining dependent variables. Lastly, there are Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) and
Spatial Error Durbin Model (SDEM) that include spatial lags of the control variables as well as the
dependent variable and a spatial lag of the control variables (WX), as well as spatially dependent
disturbances.
As discussed above and based upon the results of the spatial analysis, we have strong reasons to
suspect that the spatial spillovers are important both theoretically and empirically when studying
the effect of access policy both with state and temporal variation. To evaluate the effects of the
Naloxone access laws on opioid overdose death rates, we first test a general non-spatial specification
against SAR and SEM models by conducting a Lagrange Multiplier. In both cases, the spatial
models were the appropriate specification 32 (LM for non-spatial against SAR = 89.8 and P-value
= 0.00, LM for non-spatial against SEM = 39.3 and p-value = 0.00). The next step is testing
SAR against SEM. By applying the robust LM test we failed to reject that the SAR model is the
most appropriate specification (LMLAG33 = 91.47 > LMERROR34 = 40.99). Knowing that the
SAR, SEM, and SLX models are nested within SDM and SDEM and for applied works LeSage
recommends applying either a SDM or SDEM35 , we continue our estimations by focusing on SDM
model which is a global spatial econometric model encompassing both SAR and SLX models.
6 Spatial Results
As discussed in the previous sections, it is important to consider the spillover effects between states
in regards to overdose death rates and Naloxone access laws. We argue that a first-order contiguity
weight matrix is good for several reasons. First, we need the weight matrix to be exogenous to
32For more information please refer to Florax et al. (2003)
33LMLAG stands for LM spatial lag
34LMERROR stands for LM spatial error
35For more information please refer to LeSage (2014)
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our estimation, and a first-order contiguity matrix fits this requirement. Secondly, geographical
proximity has been shown to be important for spillovers (e.g., Jaffe (1989); Jaffe et al. (1993);
Attila (2000), Chagas et al. (2016)).
Table 6 presents the spatial regressions results for Models 1 and 2 as discussed in section 3.
Within these two models, there are no statistically significant direct effects of access laws on overdose
death rates. Indirect effects are positive and statistically significant. When direct and indirect effects
are combined, both models show positive impacts, meaning that opioid overdose death rates increase
following the implementation of Naloxone access laws.
Table 6: Estimation results for two models of access laws: dummy (NAL 1), days after passage of
access law
Determinants Model 1 Model 2
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
Naloxone access law 1 0.049 4.687*** - -
(0.894) (0.000)
Days after NAL 1 law - - -0.56 3.270***
(0.170) (0.007)
Days after NAL 1 law 2 - - 0.0001 -0.0006**
(0.233) (0.062)
Medical marijuana law 0.415 1.175 0.509 1.534
(0.230) (0.195) (0.152) (0.123)
Heroin related arrest 0.006*** 0.007 0.006*** 0.006*
(0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.066)
Opioid prescription 0.011*** 0.029 0.011*** 0.029***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employment Ratio 48.511*** -58.280 44.024*** -56.75***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.006)
Population density -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.170) (0.732) (0.352) (0.826)
Income inequality index 0.011 -0.026 0.010 -0.015
(0.780) (0.788) (0.801) (0.872)
College graduate -0.101 0.034 -0.087 0.039
(0.101) (0.808) (0.150) (0.782)
Education spending per student 0.127 -0.151 0.177 -0.095
(0.324) (0.614) (0.183) (0.756)
Poverty -0.087 0.009 -0.095 0.075
(0.525) (0.977) (0.495) (0.822)
Unemployment 0.024 0.340 0.006 0.382
(0.823) (0.174) (0.956) (0.171)
Uninsured 0.004 0.062 0.000 0.032
(0.927) (0.578) (0.988) (0.780)
Per capita income -3.688*** 2.876 -3.500*** 2.385
(0.000) (0.075) (0.000) (0.165)
ρ 0.26 0.27
(0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.85 0.85
Observations 784 784
Note: P-values in parenthesis
*, **, and *** refer to 10% 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Model 3 differentiates between laws by breaking them down into their specific provisions and
reveals more information about the impacts of laws by differentiating based upon provisions. Table
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7 shows the estimation results for access laws by provision. Given the statistically significant
spatial autocorrelation coefficient (ρ), the parameter estimates in the two-way fixed effects spatial
autoregressive model cannot be interpreted as non-spatial models. We estimate the direct and
indirect effects to yield an interpretation of the spatial spillover effects.
The results in Table 7 reveal that the direct, indirect and total effects of the Naloxone access law
are heterogeneous when we break down these laws by their provisions. The direct effect indicates
the effects of the treatment status on own state opioid overdose death rate, and indirect effect
shows the effects of provisions on surrounding states. Out of eleven provisions, five (immunity from
professional sanctions for prescribers (NAL 4), immunity from professional sanctions for dispensers
(NAL 7), third party authorizations (NAL 8), immunity from civil liability for layperson (NAL 11),
and removing criminal liability for possession of naloxone without a prescription (NAL 12)) have
statistically significant direct effects. Positive direct effects occur for NAL 4, NAL 11, and NAL
12 - meaning these provisions increase overdose death rates in the states where they are enacted.
Negative direct effects (provisions decrease overdose death rates in states where enacted) are found
for NAL 7 and 8.
Four provisions have significant indirect effects with the same sign as the direct effects (NAL 4,
NAL 7, NAL 11, and NAL 12). In each case, indirect effects are much larger than direct effects,
from 1.78 and 4.99 times greater than the corresponding direct effects. All provision variables with
either a significant direct or indirect effect (NAL 4, NAL 7, NAL 8, NAL 10, NAL 11, and NAL
12) also have significant total effects. Thus, both positive and negative impacts are found to exist
for Naloxone law provisions with spillover effects dominating the direct effects.
Other influences on opioid overdose death rates include heroin related arrests and opioid pre-
scription with positive, statistically significant direct, indirect and total effects. Thus, more heroin
related crime and prescription opioids in one state will increase the opioid overdose death rate both
within that state as well as surrounding states. Employment of those who work at mining, con-
struction and manufacture industries also increases opioid overdose death rates within the state,
but decreases this rate in first order surrounding states.
Unemployment rate has positive and statistically significant indirect and total effects on opioid
overdose death. The implication of these positive coefficients is that a higher unemployment rate
in one state will increase opioid overdose death rates in surrounding states. Per capita income has
statistically significant effects on opioid overdose death rates - negative direct and positive indirect
effects. The implication is that increased per capita income in state i reduces opioid overdose death
rate in state i, but increases death rate in neighboring j states. States with higher per capita incomes
and population densities have lower opioid overdose death rates, while less urban states with lower
per capita incomes suffer from higher opioid overdose death rate.
These results are consistent with Keyes et al. (2014), but contradict Gatti et al. (2007), whose
research focused on Italy. In the Gatti and Tremblay study, the authors found drug overdose deaths
were explained mainly by wealth. However, without an exact definition for the total number of
deaths from drug overdose, the reason for discrepancy could be the definition of drug overdose.
Also from Table 7, population density has a significant and negative direct and indirect effect on
opioid overdose death rate. The implication of these negative coefficients is that a more dense
area has less opioid overdose death rate both within the state and in adjacent states. College
graduate rate has a negative and significant direct effect on opioid overdose death rate. Other
variables (medical marijuana law, income inequality, education spending per student, poverty rate,
and uninsured rate) do not have significant effects on overdose death rates.
Finally, to check the sensitivity of our results, a new dependent variable of total opioid overdose
death rates introduced in section 4 is examined. As pointed out by Rees et al. (2017), opioid overdose
deaths published by CDC is based on the underlying cause of death (accidental, intentional, and
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Table 7: Direct and indirect effects of SDM model (Based on Model 3)
Determinants Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect
Naloxone access law 2 3.335 -0.322 3.012
(0.481) (0.978) (0.832)
Naloxone access law 3 -1.774 6.429 4.655
(0.715) (0.596) (0.744)
Naloxone access law 4 14.256*** 25.337*** 39.593***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Naloxone access law 5 -0.115 2.778 2.662
(0.970) (0.730) (0.776)
Naloxone access law 6 -2.233 -6.854 -9.087
(0.516) (0.444) (0.397)
Naloxone access law 7 -10.862*** -21.315** -32.178***
(0.001) (0.023) (0.004)
Naloxone access law 8 -1.918*** -1.287 -3.206*
(0.003) (0.420) (0.103)
Naloxone access law 9 -0.366 -0.170 -0.536
(0.666) (0.943) (0.843)
Naloxone access law 10 -1.337 -3.426 -4.763*
(0.108) (0.145) (0.097)
Naloxone access law 11 1.918*** 6.469*** 8.387***
(0.016) (0.008) (0.003)
Naloxone access law 12 2.667*** 12.981*** 15.648***
(0.015) (0.000) (0.000)
Medical marijuana law 0.077 0.177 0.255
(0.816) (0.837) (0.804)
Heroin related arrest 0.004*** 0.005 0.010***
(0.000) (0.116) (0.006)
Opioid prescription 0.012*** 0.028*** 0.040***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employment Ratio 53.368*** -53.916*** -0.547
(0.000) (0.005) (0.978)
Population density -0.003** -0.010* -0.013**
(0.027) (0.062) (0.026)
Income inequality index 0.045 -0.049 -0.004
(0.248) (0.583) (0.965)
College graduate rate -0.115* 0.052 -0.063
(0.053) (0.699) (0.676)
Education spending per student 0.082 -0.060 0.022
(0.515) (0.829) (0.943)
Poverty rate -0.120 -0.152 -0.272
(0.380) (0.653) (0.465)
Unemployment rate 0.140 0.648** 0.788***
(0.213) (0.014) (0.004)
Uninsured rate -0.020 -0.037 -0.058
(0.655) (0.741) (0.662)
Per capita income -3.540*** 3.245** -0.295
(0.000) (0.044) (0.863)
ρ 0.23
(0.000)
R2 0.87
Observations 784
Note: P-values in parenthesis
*, **, and *** refer to 10% 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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undetermined intent) (Ruhm (2016)). In robustness check the dependent variable is a comprehensive
measure of opioid overdoses, which is rather similar to our limited opioid overdose death variable.
The results of the estimation of equation 3 with the new dependent variable are reported in Table
7. These results are very similar in terms of statistical significance and coefficient signs for the
Naloxone access law provisions compared to those in Table 7.
7 Conclusions
In this research, we examined the impact of Naloxone access laws enacted by state legislatures
around the U.S. on opioid overdose deaths and their spillover effects to surrounding states. We
applied spatial econometrics models to avoid potential bias in coefficients, which arises by ignoring
spatial autocorrelation in ordinary least square models. Our regression results from all three models
suggest that while some significant influences exist on overdose death rates within the state, spillover
effects of access laws dominate in terms of magnitude  about four times larger than significant direct
effects in Table 7. Thus, Naloxone access laws have more regional than state level effects.
Breaking down access laws by their provisions, our results show that enactment of a Naloxone
access law effects opioid overdose death rates both within the state and in neighboring states.
We find positive direct, indirect and total effects for law provisions that: provide immunity from
professional sanction for prescriber, provide immunity from civil liability for layperson, and remove
criminal liability for possession of Naloxone. These three provisions increase aggregate opioid related
death rates both within the state and neighboring states. Based upon our results, these provisions
do not help reduce opioid overdose death rates.
Conversely, three Naloxone access law provisions (i.e. immunity from professional sanction for
dispenser, third parties' authorization to prescribe Naloxone, and immunity from criminal liability
for a layperson administering Naloxone) have negative total effects, reducing opioid overdose death
rates in aggregate, mainly within neighboring states. Immunity from professional sanction for
dispenser decreases opioid overdose death rates within neighboring states. Also, provisions that
remove criminal, rather than civil liabilities decrease overdose death rates.
It is useful to compare the magnitude of the aggregate effects from Naloxone access law provisions
with the effects for heroin related arrests and drug prescriptions. To do that, we use the state level
means to compare relative magnitudes. For example, if an overdose prevention policy could increase
heroin arrests by 100% and reduce opioid prescriptions by 50%, the impact of this policy would
reduce overdose death by 2.79 and 1.13 per 100,000 population, respectively. Conversely, the total
effect of enactment of a Naloxone access law containing the three most common provisions (NAL 8,
10, and 11) results in a slight increase in the overdose death rate of 0.43 per 100,000 population.
Spatial econometrics has an important role to play in research on drug epidemics (see e.g.,
Partridge et al. (2012) for a general discussion of the importance of spatial econometrics).36 We
demonstrate in this paper use of conventional, non-spatial analyses are biased in this environment.
Overall, due to a significant spatial autoregressive component, the opioid overdose death rate in
one particular state is associated with opioid overdose death rates in neighboring states. This
result means there are spillover effects in opioid overdose death rates among neighboring regions
(states). An increasing trend in opioid overdose death rates in one particular state may be followed
by neighboring states as well and vice versa. Thus, opioid overdose death rates represent more a
regional epidemic rather than a state level epidemic.
We relate the mixed positive and negative results of our research to the neo-classical economics
36For more information, please refer to Gibbons and Overman (2012), McMillen (2012), and Corrado and Fingleton
(2012).
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Table 8: Direct and indirect effects of SDM model for the unrestricted dataset (Based on Model 3)
Determinants Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect
Naloxone access law 2 3.355 -3.926 -0.370
(0.484) (0.761) (0.980)
Naloxone access law 3 -2.001 8.991 6.989
(0.703) (0.506) (0.661)
Naloxone access law 4 14.764*** 29.174*** 43.938***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Naloxone access law 5 -0.365 4.990 4.624
(0.911) (0.575) (0.651)
Naloxone access law 6 -2.001 -8.430 -10.431
(0.581) (0.399) (0.376)
Naloxone access law 7 -11.346*** -25.767** -37.113***
(0.001) (0.010) (0.002)
Naloxone access law 8 -2.098*** -1.897 -3.996*
(0.002) (0.261) (0.057)
Naloxone access law 9 -0.478 -0.609 0.130
(0.593) (0.798) (0.962)
Naloxone access law 10 -1.423 -3.662 -5.085*
(0.115) (0.145) (0.094)
Naloxone access law 11 2.120*** 7.305*** 9.426***
(0.014) (0.005) (0.002)
Naloxone access law 12 2.916*** 12.845*** 15.761***
(0.009) (0.000) (0.000)
Medical marijuana law 0.077 0.177 0.255
(0.816) (0.837) (0.804)
Heroin related arrest 0.004*** 0.005 0.010***
(0.000) (0.116) (0.006)
Opioid prescription 0.012*** 0.028*** 0.040***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employment Ratio 53.368*** -53.916*** -0.547
(0.000) (0.005) (0.978)
Population density -0.003** -0.010* -0.013**
(0.027) (0.062) (0.026)
Income inequality index 0.045 -0.049 -0.004
(0.248) (0.583) (0.965)
College graduate rate -0.115* 0.052 -0.063
(0.053) (0.699) (0.676)
Education spending per student 0.082 -0.060 0.022
(0.515) (0.829) (0.943)
Poverty rate -0.120 -0.152 -0.272
(0.380) (0.653) (0.465)
Unemployment rate 0.140 0.648** 0.788***
(0.213) (0.014) (0.004)
Uninsured rate -0.020 -0.037 -0.058
(0.655) (0.741) (0.662)
Per capita income -3.540*** 3.245** -0.295
(0.000) (0.044) (0.863)
ρ 0.23
(0.000)
R2 0.87
Observations 784
Note: P-values in parenthesis
*, **, and *** refer to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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concept of consumers trying to maximize their utility. The consumption of opioids provides utility
for a typical addict, although some economists have characterized an addict as an imperfect rational
behavior that is struggling between ending addiction and adoring opioid consumption (Chaloupka
et al. (1999)). Enactment of a Naloxone access law may affect current and future opioid consumption
of addicted persons by reducing the cost of opioid consumption. By having access to Naloxone
(sometimes inexpensive, but quick and effective medicine to reverse the consequences of overdosing),
addicts may increase their propensity to consume opioids. Addicts thereby adjust their response to
the law by continued opioid use with less fear and uncertainty of dealing with an overdose death (the
moral hazard problem). The end result is that while administering Naloxone prevents an overdose
death, the expanded ability to administer Naloxone does not reduce the death rate.
Our findings have policy implications for both federal and states governments. The provisions
with negative coefficients (immunity from professional sanction for dispensers, third party autho-
rization, and immunity from criminal liability for users) should definitely be included in any access
law. However, it is problematic to interpret the results of Model 3 (model with Naloxone access law
provisions) as some provisions should be included in laws (those with negative effects) while other
provisions should be excluded from laws (those with positive effects). In practice, provisions with
opposite effect signs often are included in most laws, examples include NAL 4 and 7 along with
NAL 10 and 11. So interpretation of single provision effect without considering the effects of other
provisions is not seen as particularly useful for policy implications.
A more preferred interpretation of Model 3 results is to aggregate across statistically significant
effects for all provisions. When we assess the aggregate impacts for direct, indirect, and total effects,
we find that in each case the net effect of Naloxone access laws is to increase opioid death rates
both within and outside the states where these laws have been enacted. Looking across multiple
provisions, these findings provide no statistical evidence that these laws reduce opioid death rates.
Our findings need to be viewed within a narrow context of Naloxone access laws as the sole
policy response to the opioid crisis. As a policy response, Naloxone treats only the symptoms of
addiction by preventing immediate death from an overdose, but does not prevent or treat addiction
as the underlying cause of opioid related overdose deaths. Our results show that when access laws
are evaluated in isolation of any other state level policy response to opioids, increasing access to
Naloxone does not reduce, but leads to increased overdose death rates. Thus, the moral hazard
perspective of this policy is the more accurate assessment of the outcome when access laws are
the only policy. Immunity from civil liability for users and immunity from criminal liability for
possession of Naloxone are provisions that show the change in behavior of the users and we see a
positive effect of these laws on opioid overdose death rates.
Enactment of a Naloxone access law is a starting point in implementing and expanding access to
save lives seems a necessary strategy, but not a sufficient response to the overdose problem. Apart
from the law enactment, both federal and state governments should consider the next steps such as
policy recommendation presented by Clark (2017) (e.g. team-based care model, more collaboration
with pharmacists, minimize cost barriers to have access to Naloxone, expanding harm reduction
treatment model). Both federal and state governments need to be involved in preventive policies
more focused on regions not one specific state.
We recognize several limitations in our research. First, many states have only recently enacted
Naloxone access laws. Since our data cover years 1999 to 2014, for those 10 states with newly
enacted laws in 2014, we do not have post implementation data. Furthermore, 10 more states
enacted laws in 2013, so that only one year of data is included in our dataset. Empirical results
may change with more post implementation data for these 20 states. Second, county level analysis
would be preferable to assess the spillover effects across states, but these data were not consistently
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available for overdose death rates.37
Further research should consider applying a hierarchical analysis and provide spillover estimates
at both levels of the hierarchy (including both county and state level data in county level model).
In addition, research should examine enactment of Naloxone access laws in conjunction with other
policy responses, such as increased intervention and treatment programs for addiction to assess the
impact of multiple policies on overdose death rates.
37For example, the CDC does not publish county level observations with less than nine overdose deaths.
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